

# B R O B D I N G N A G

Broddingnag #66	1966AQ (S'08)	1966AV (W'06)	29 July 1967
-----------------	---------------	---------------	--------------

Game 1966AQ

Spring 1908

## RUSSIANS AND FRENCH EXCHANGE GERMAN BASES NAVAL WAR IMPENDS IN MEDITERRANEAN RUSSIANS EXPEL TEUTONS FROM CAPITAL

The moves:

**RUSSIA (Reinsel):** Army Norway support army Moscow to St. Petersburg.  
 Army Kiel to Munich. Army Berlin support army Kiel to Munich.  
 Army Tyrolia support army Kiel to Munich. Army Serbia support army Budapest to Trieste.  
 Army Budapest to Trieste. Army Rumania support army Sevastopol.  
 Army Sevastopol support army Rumania. Army Galicia to Bohemia.  
 Army Moscow to St. Petersburg. Fleet Skagerrak to Denmark.  
 Fleet Black Sea to Helgoland Bight.

**FRANCE (Thompson):** Fleet Brest to Mid-Atlantic. Army Marseilles to Burgundy.  
 Fleet Tunis to Tyrrhenian Sea. Fleet Western Mediterranean to Tyrrhenian Sea.  
 Fleet Piedmont stand. Fleet London support fleet English Channel to North Sea.  
 Fleet English Channel to North Sea. Army Yorkshire stand. Army Munich to Berlin.  
 Army Ruhr support army Holland to Kiel. Army Holland to Kiel. Army Belgium to Holland.

**TURKEY (Greene):** Fleet Rome to Tyrrhenian Sea. Fleet Trieste to Adriatic.  
 Fleet Venice to Apulia. Fleet Albania to Ionian Sea. Army Greece to Albania.  
 Fleet Bulgaria (south coast) to Aegean Sea. Fleet Black Sea to Constantinople.  
 Army Constantinople to Bulgaria. Army Armenia to Ankara.

**GERMANY (Nelson):** Army St. Petersburg stand.

Underlined moves do not succeed. The French army formerly in Munich must retreat and has only Silesia open. The German army in St. Petersburg must retreat to either Finland or Livonia. Deadline for retreat orders is Saturday, 12 August 1967. As there is only one doubtful retreats all players are asked to submit moves for Fall at the same time. They may, of course, be made conditional on the direction of the retreat.

### PRESS RELEASES

Constantinople, 4 Jan. General Confusion and Dis-maye have seized the government, kicked out Mufta A. Pasha, shot a few more quartermasters and naval officers, and declared war on France.  
 Paris, 6 Jan. 50,000 Frenchwomen can't be wrong! The new "Love Division" will be dispatched toward Bohemia from Munich. "What a way to go", sighed the Russian defenders.

Constantinople, 10 Jan. A second poll of Europe has been completed, but instead of just Latakia, Syria, all of Europe's peasants were asked. The tabulation of the answers:

	<u>Love</u>	<u>Hate</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
Do you like the Tsar?	8%	89%	3%
Do you like the President?	5	93	2
Do you like the Kaiser?	99½	0	½
Do you like Larry Peery?	0	99½	½ (never heard of him)
Do you like the Sultan?	98	1	1
Do you like Turkey's policy?	1	97	2

Game 1966AV

BRITISH NAVY CONTINUES EXPANSION

Winter 1906

ENGLAND (Wells): Build fleet Liverpool. Build fleet London.

ITALY (Francis): No move received. Gamesmaster removes fleet Gulf of Lyon.

Deadline for moves for Spring 1907 is Saturday, 12 August 1967. As Charles Wells will be netely arrived in Norway at that time, discretion will be used in enforcing the deadline, as far as his moves are concerned. Moves from other players will be accepted up until the time of receipt of Charles' moves, provided the latter are not outrageously beyond the deadline date. Charles address in Norway will be, c/o Sven Høiland, Gislemyrveien 2A, Kristiansand S., Norway.

SEALED BAG

Gene Prosnitz, 200 Clinton St., Brooklyn, N.Y., 11201:

I'd like to add my comments to the rating systems. One criticism is that, since they cover only a small fraction of games, those actually completed, they are more valuable as historical documents than as indications of what's really going on today. I've noticed that certain players who seem to be doing consistently well in current games (e.g., Latimer, Peery, Zelazny, Pournelle, etc.) are nowhere in the rating systems because they haven't yet completed games.

Your recent listing of current positions was a step in the right direction. However, it would have given a more accurate picture if you listed the starting players who had been eliminated, and also distinguished between standbys and starters.

However, my principal criticism is directed to the entire idea of rating systems, since they encourage people to play for second (or third) place, rather than play for what, in my mind and in the minds of the other New York players I play with, is the primary purpose

of the game; namely to either win (or tie) yourself, or if that is not possible, then to prevent someone else from winning and preserve the balance of power. I propose to remedy this by the following rating system;

The winner of a game gets 60 Points (or if there is a tie, two players each get 30 points). All the other starting players (except those who had to be replaced by standbys) get the same number of points as the year the game ends. If the game ends in 1907, the player who was wiped out in 1902, and the one who survives with 16 supply centers, each get seven points. If the game lasts until 1920, they each get 20 points.

This may seem inequitable, but, on the other hand, it is often the second player who is most at fault for permitting the winner to triumph, whereas the poor guy who was wiped out in 1902 may just have been the unfortunate victim of an alliance he couldn't break. Also, generally speaking, the better the players, the longer the game should last, so the better players are hereby rewarded, whereas other rating systems make no allowance for the quality of the opposition.

(I might add that this proposal would hurt my own rating, since I seem to be headed towards one or two second place finishes, in one case due to the stubbornness of one player refusing to ally against the front runner; whereas, on the other hand, my potential victories are buried in Jim Sanders' dormant publications. )

Under this system, rating points would, of course, be divided by total games played, to obtain an average.

Another interesting idea, although probably not feasible, would be to rate players on the separate areas of tactical skill and diplomatic skill (with poker Psychology as a subdivision of tactical skill). For example, I'd like to put together a two headed team, with Jim Goldman planning tactics, and Larry Peery conducting diplomatic negotiations.

((+Formerly, I made an attempt to provide a rating list that took into account games-in-progress. The last edition of the Current Game Rating List, was published in ERQB #52, last February. It listed Jerry Fournelle in eighth position. It was only two or three weeks ago that Jerry's name appeared on other rating lists as a result of completion of Game 1965D which he won. In other words that Rating List anticipated events by some 6 months or more. I didn't keep the thing up on account of the large amount of detailed record keeping involved; but there is no doubt that such a list would be more informative than most which, as you say, record quite ancient history, for the most part.

Also, I am inclined to agree that the high scores obtainable for a second place, or a third place, is an objection to my own rating list, and to the centre-year systems. However, the same objection can not be raised against the Reinsel system which gives the big prize to the winner, and the winner only, and mere consolation prizes to other survivors. Theoretical objections can be raised to the Reinsel system: It contains a mass of arbitrary elements. But there is no doubt that it has two very real practical advantages. It is simple. Elaborate tables

of supply centres, and the like are not required. And, above all, what should appeal to you, it lets the winner win.

I am not sure that I fully understand your system. As I get it, you give no points to either the player who drops out, or to his replacement, only to players who stay the course. With that understanding, but making an exception for Jerry Fournelle who actually won in a game in which he was a replacement, your rating list gives the results tabulated below. The games considered are the same as those used for the EROB list in the last issue.

B. Felz	60.0	Bailee	13.0	von Metzke	10.2
Boardman	60.0	Daniels	13.0	Baker	10.1
Wells	60.0	Blake	13.0	Keshner	9.0
Fournelle	60.0	Bounde	13.0	Lerner	9.0
Latimer	60.0	Reinsel	13.0	Lake	9.0
Turner	60.0	Sattel	13.0	Davey	9.0
Smythe	43.5	Banks	12.0	Davidson	9.0
Miller	33.5	Sandoval	12.0	Owings	7.0
Brooks	30.0	Thompson	11.5	Gemignani	7.0
Huff	28.0	Christian	11.0	Dygert	7.0
Nelson	27.7	Brannan	11.0	Mazor	7.0
McCallum	27.0	Gold	11.0	Kuch	7.0
MacKenzie	24.8	Root	11.0	McDaniels	6.0
Clark	21.5	Farness	11.0	Bigglestone	5.0
Lebane	21.5	Tzudiker	11.0	Krogh	5.0
D. Felz	18.0	Jacks	11.0	Schow	5.0
Moning	15.2	Goldman	10.5	Adams	5.0
Harley	14.0	Ward	10.5		
Castora	14.0	Schultz	10.3		

I must say that I am not wildly enthusiastic over any listing that puts Smythe in seventh place, Nelson in eleventh, and Moning in seventeenth. The latter immediately ahead of Harley who, I think, has never played four consecutive moves in any game. (To be frank, the trouble here is the method of averaging. Remind me sometime to go into the matter of why any Rating Scheme using averages must use asymptotic averages and not raw averages.)

And, congratulations on Chalker having resumed control of his games. There is now hope that those games you hope to win will be played through. jamcc)+))

DELMIL NELSON, c/o General Delivery, Port Frances, Ontario, Canada:

Lately, whenever I have a choice of countries, I've been picking Russia. It's the most interesting of all, partly for the reason you mention ((EROB #64)), i.e., it is a swing country. Game #19651, where I was Russia, also shows its tactical interest. And it shows how one lost move (in the Empire State Building mail chute) also changes the whole game.

((+ (mail chutes haven't bothered me yet. However, there are several allies who have recently gone on vacation, without leaving

forwarding addresses, making consultation impossible. Chuting and shooting are, alike, too good for them. jamcc)+))

John Boardman, 592 16th St., Brooklyn, NY, 11218:

My records on 1965F are as follows:

	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14
E	3	4	4	5	6	7	7	7	9	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>	12	10	12#	8
F	3	4	3	4	5	5	7	9	9	9	9#	8	7	6	6
G	3	<u>4</u>	5	3	<u>1</u>										
I	3	<u>4</u>	4	5	6	6	6	6	6	5	4	2	1		
A	3	5	6	6	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	4	2							
R	4	6	5	5	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>	2	2	1						
T	3	4	5	<u>5</u>	6	7	<u>8</u>	8	9	10	11	12	16#	16	16

I have underlined the values that differ from yours as published in BROB #65.

In both the new Graustark games, Germany picked up three supply centres on the first year. Of course, in 1967U France didn't move in Spring 1901, and in 1967V Russia didn't move at that time. Going further back, Derek Nelson as Italy made three Winter 1901 builds in 1963A, a five-man game which was the very first postal Diplomacy game. Allan Calhamer made 3 builds as Germany in Winter 1901 of 1963B, the first 7-man postal Diplomacy game. John Koning as Russia picked up 3 supply centers in the first year of 1965L. Jim Goldman got 3 as France in the first year of 1964C. So did Charles Turner in 1965AP, a 5-man game. Russia, played by Joel Sattel, got 3 supply centers in "1901" of 1965S - and was the first man to be eliminated from the game. James MacKenzie got 3 as France in 1964D during 1901.

(I suppose that, in principle, it should be possible for Russia to get 4 supply centers in 1901. However, this requires extremely stupid play on the part of the other players. The foreign supply center that the army in Moscow can reach in two moves without being convoyed is Norway. England can usually reach Norway in Fall 1901 and can always keep Russia out of Norway on that move. The other is Rumania, but what will Turkey be doing in the meantime?)

Thanks for your offer to help me keep up the game listings. After I finish running the current rosters, we'll see.

((+(To take that last item first. I certainly hope that you will find it possible to keep up the game rosters, with or without help. With the one exception of Brannen, I think that every gamesmaster makes use of your numbers for the games to some extent. Some, such as ADAG, Lonely Mountain, and this journal, use your numbers exclusively to designate their games; others have their own designations but still use your numbers when referring to "foreign" games, for instance in their Rating Lists. Abandonment of the Graustark rosters will certainly mean a good deal of confusion.

The one thing which would be worse than having no over-all designation system at all, would be for there to be three or four, each

purportedly covering the whole field, and each claiming to be the continuation of the Boardman numbering system. There is a real danger of such a situation developing. After your original announcement that you would shortly discontinue the Graustark rosters Charles Wells wrote me and suggested that he and I should, jointly, publish a continuation of your rosters. In the latest Glock, #8, Dave Lebling indicates that he proposes to publish a continuation, and I have no doubt that there are others with the same thing in mind. No unified roster will mean a certain amount of confusion, nothing worse; a half dozen of them, will mean complete chaos. So, if you must give up the Graustark rosters I hope that you will be able to designate some successor whose continuation would, thereby, inherit the prestige which the Graustark rosters have earned over the years. Otherwise the situation will be very confused indeed. Best of all, of course, would be for you to carry on. If time and space are the deciding factors why not cut down on some of the detail now included. The essential factors are the beginning of the game, with a designation assigned, and a players list so that everyone knows what game is being considered, and the outcome at the end of it. At present your rosters also include a great deal of additional information, such as players eliminated in mid-game, and so on. This is of interest, but not nearly so essential as the designation at the beginning, and the outcome at the end.

Thanks for the corrected centre-year table for game 1965F. I have replaced your asterisks, to represent a power whose forces are one less than its supply centres, by the # sign. Your version is correct in every case of there being a discrepancy between this list and the one published in the last issue of BROB. An indication that gamesmasters ought to publish centre-year lists for their own games as their records will undoubtedly be better than those of an onlooker.

Yes, as mentioned last time, my statement that only France ever makes 3 gains in 1901 was far too sweeping. Every country, with the one exception of England, can under certain circumstances make 3 gains in 1901. And Russia can, as you say, make 4. In both of the 5-man games completed the country which made three gains the first year went on to win the game. In 7-man games, on the other hand, the outcome has been very different. In eight of the 17 7-man games so far completed a country made three gains the first year. The games, country, player, and outcome are tabulated below:

1963B	Germany	Calhamer	2 forces at end of game
1964C	France	Goldman	1 force surviving
1964D	France	MacKenzie	1 force surviving
1965G	France	Koning	11 forces surviving; runner-up
1965I	France	Thompson	Eliminated
	Russia	Nelson	4 forces surviving
1965L	Russia	Koning	Draw
1965S	Russia	Sattel	Eliminated
1966E	Germany	Mazor	Eliminated.

With the exception of Koning's draw and his runner-up position none of the players who made 3 gains the first year achieved very much in the long run. Which gives some point to a remark made by Brannan well over

two years ago (I think it was in an early Wild 'n Woolly, but I don't have the reference). He said that he believed it to be a mistake for a player to build 3 forces the first year, even when able to do so, because such inordinant growth would inevitably attract the hostility of adjacent powers. The record seems to support his view. In roughly half the 7-man games completed a power has made 3 gains the first year. In no case has the power that did so won the game. jamco+))

Gene Prosnitz, address above.: I found Smythe's article ((EROB #63)) quite thought provoking, although I disagreed with his conclusions in two respects: I don't think Germany is in such bad shape, as it's frequently best for France to attack England, or best for England to attack Russia. Also, I feel Germany is best off attacking France, not England.

However, sometimes a player strives not for the theoretically best alliance, but for the alliance which is easiest to get. E.G., as France, I might feel my best strategy would be an alliance with Germany if I could get it, but might write to England because England is more likely to accept my offer.

Re your comments about correspondence ((in private letter)): Your point about people making quick double crosses in the slap-happy mood of over the board play is a good one, which I hadn't thought of. On the other hand, a player might be more tempted to double cross in postal play because, especially if he's not a regular, he's less likely to have to deal with these individuals in another game in the future. Also, of course, there's the fact that in over the board play your ex-ally will usually know when you have commenced negotiations with your former enemy. (Unless you're extremely devious and manage to switch sides by means of an unseen note, which I once did with telling effect).

In one game a friend of mine has doubled crossed four countries and has offered to double cross a fifth, all before 1903. Now it is true that this player is pretty untrustworthy in over the board play, but he wouldn't risk backstabbing all those players if he felt he would face them in another game a few weeks later.

My experience, in contrast to yours, has been to receive very little correspondence (and no long distance calls). For example (I just counted it up), I'm in six games not counting three buried with Jim Sanders. My position is tenable in each one, with no more than one enemy in each, with one possible exception. However, in the past 3 or 4 weeks I've received letters from only five players. I have written to 11 other players (referring to letters written more than two weeks ago) without receiving replies, yet at least 7 of these players are allies or friendly neutrals, only one is an enemy, with the other three in doubt. I've found it quite common to write a request, receive no answer, and then have the other player do what I requested when the zine appears a few weeks later.

((+(The same thing has happened to me. There is no doubt that there is far too little letter writing for a game that is based, essentially, on negotiation. Some players do not seem to grasp the idea that an agree-

ment is only reached when both parties have signified their acceptance of it. And, as you say, the ~~ever-the-board~~ game suffers from the inevitable lack of privacy, so that very few agreements can be reached without the other players being at least half aware of them. As is the case in the real world, of course. I suppose from this point of view the best game is the move-a-week game where the players face each other at regular intervals but carry on negotiation by phone or personally in the interval between moves. Negotiation is secret, and at the same time it is not hindered by dislike of letter writing. Its drawback is, as was pointed out by Dean Dickensheet in Craustark about three years ago, that it tends to absorb the whole time and energy of the players: Students fail their exams, husbands lose their wives, and employees their jobs. It ceases to be a game but becomes a way of life. "Ugh", as Luise said on a cover of an early Wild 'n Woolly.

Re Germany. I agree that its difficulties are not a lack of opportunity in 1901, as Smythe contends. See the article in the last issue for further details.

In a part of your letter which I haven't quoted you mention a possibility of your writing a number of articles on Diplomacy. A letter received a few days ago from Frank Kusbach makes it clear that anything of the sort that you produce has an avid public eagerly waiting for it. jamcc)+))

((+(The last issue of DROB carried a quotation from Harold Nicolson's book, Diplomacy, to the effect that the worst diplomats are missionaries, fanatics, and lawyers. Two lawyers, Gene Prosnitz and Sid Cochran, and one non-lawyer, John Boardman, commented. Their comments appear below. My apologies to the writers, whose letters I have broken up so as to bring their comments on this topic together. jamcc)+))

Gene Prosnitz, address above.: I agree that missionaries and fanatics make bad diplomats, their strong feelings make them unable to present cool, rational arguments, in addition to reducing the amount of tact they have. However, lawyers should be the opposite (Does that imply that lawyers don't have feelings?). When I write for an alliance I'll frequently set forth a "logical" argument (if I can find one). It gets interesting when I find myself in one game selling Italy on the virtues of attacking Austria, and in the next game attempting to convince Italy that it is better to attack France.

I faced this situation recently when I was Germany and a friend was Italy. He reminded me of my theory that Italy should attack Austria. However, I convinced him that he'd be better off moving west, partly on the basis that I was a "reliable" ally, and partly on the basis that "you ought to ally with someone from the same city, since you know most of these other guys never write, and it's difficult to plan tactical campaigns with them".

John Boardman, address above: It's been my experience that Diplomacy players who are lawyers are more contentious than others. It is a scientist's assumption that the rules of a game partake in some respects of the nature of laws of nature, or, better, of the postulates upon which a system of mathematics is



erected. Thus, they are fixed conditions, within which the system operates. But for a lawyer, it is a fundamental assumption that the effects of any law can be evaded if sufficient talking is done. (Cf. Ernest Cuneo's Memoirs, in which he says that Mayor LaGuardia once asked him to prepare an argument on a certain labor-management contract, on the assumption that a certain practice was "explicitly implied".) So, they talk.

S. A. Cochran, Jr., 805 Citizens First National Bank Building, Tyler, Texas.

I suggest that you do my calling too much honor. The fact is that the essence of the lawyer's calling, his professional outlook, as it were, is that there are rules that bind himself and his client; if nothing else, the rules of conduct in court, although sometimes even this boundary is overstepped; consider the Communist trials-- I think these were the Smith Act cases, reported as U. S. vs Nelson, et al -- held in New York before Judge Medina. The diplomat on the other hand is acting as agent for a sovereign power, one that is bound by any rules at all, including the ones concerning the inviolability of envoys, only so long as it is felt that observance is in the best interest of the sovereign, whether he be monarch or the First Citizen of the People's Democratic Republic of Rome, for instance. Say, whether he be a constitutional monarch, such as the King of Sweden, or merely a tyrant, such as Dionysius of Syracuse in the Classic Age, or Chairman Mao, or the President of the United States of America, however you may classify that officer.

The result is the unseemly conduct of such organs of the profession as the ABA Section of World Peace through World Law, operating from the demonstrably false premise that the entire world wants peace strongly enough to surrender its power to defend itself. Without making a detailed presentation it is submitted that the conduct of France on the European scene today, as well as that of the combatants in the Near East in recent weeks, and that of India vis-a-vis Goa and its northeastern frontier in recent years, much less that of India re Kashmir, is to be adduced in disproof of the premise.

In diplomacy, as contrasted to the practice of private law (i.e., law where the sovereign is not a party to the proceeding, as in criminal law, or suits on behalf of or against the sovereign), no holds are barred. Thus, although the courts will protect a right of privacy of correspondence, you will often hear the comment of a former Secretary of State of the United States, "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail!" denounced as the height of fatuity in diplomacy, however honorable the sentiment. Will it be denied that Chairman Khrushchev's beating on his desk with his shoe, however vulgar the act, was the height of diplomacy to its intended audience (not, of course, the western representation in the UN, so much as the 'uncommitted' delegations and possibly the American TV audience)? To be sure, this and Castro's killing his own chickens in the Hotel Theresa back in 1960 were the height of self-assertion, but they posted a warning to the 'uncommitted' that 'we Communists are the wave of the future--look how we defy these effete capitalists'.

The foregoing is not to be interpreted as entirely contra

advocates; a gamesmaster must, of course, have a bent in the legalistic direction.

((+It is interesting that John Boardman, a physicist, and Sid Cochran, a lawyer, object to lawyers as diplomats for exactly the opposite reasons: Boardman says that a lawyer never considers himself bound by anything, but always feels free to develop a new argument in support of his cause; while Cochran says that a lawyer cannot act effectively as a diplomat because he feels himself constrained to abide by legal procedure, while he feels that a diplomat, acting for a sovereign power, should be free to do as he, or his master, pleases.

The question of sovereignty, which Cochran brings up, is certainly a major part of the issue. Elsewhere in his book Nicolson has an instructive comment on the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Versailles. It is his contention that the allied governments were not able to negotiate with President Wilson precisely because they did not feel him to be a representative of the sovereign power of the United States. The other nations knew that any agreement reached would have to be ratified by the United States Senate. They also knew that Wilson had lost the confidence of that body. So that in this case the sovereign body with whom they ought to try to negotiate was the Senate of the United States, but the man in front of them was not an agent of that body nor did he have its support. Had this occurred with an envoy less eminent than the President of the United States, it might have been possible to have asked for the recall of the representative and for his replacement by some one more truly representative of the Senate. Such a course of action was, of course, impossible for the President, the titular head of the United States government, so that the allies felt themselves throughout as acting in a void and not really negotiating at all.

Nicolson's feeling is, of course, that all diplomacy is best left in the hands of professional diplomats, and that negotiations by amateurs are unlikely to be successful. Nicolson was the son of a diplomat, and spent his boyhood in the various legations and embassies to which his father was attached. He himself entered the Foreign Service as a young man but resigned after a few years to pursue a career in literature, journalism, and broadcasting, what would now be termed the communication arts. It is, therefore, natural for him to have a predilection for professional diplomats, and he is, no doubt, right in that preference in most circumstances.

However, it does seem to me that there will be circumstances, especially following sudden or violent changes of government, when it will in fact be impossible to employ a professional diplomat, and have both his own government and the government with which he is dealing feel that he is truly representative of his government. In such circumstances, some amateur will have to fill the role, and it is important to consider where satisfactory envoys can be found. I would have thought that a lawyer would have been one of the more logical choices, but Nicolson says they are the worst possible choice, comparable with fanatics. And Cochran, himself a lawyer, and the only one of our correspondents to address himself to the question at issue and not

merely to our game, agrees.

The whole question of affinities between professions is an interesting one. It has frequently been noted, for example, that there is a strong connection between medicine and authorship. This connection goes back into the mists of antiquity--I suppose that most would agree that St. Luke's is the most readable of the three synoptic gospels. And it has included authors ranging from the highest artistic level to the most popular. As examples from the turn-of-the-century period of our game, Chekhov ("Literature is my mistress; medicine my lawfully wedded wife") would be an example of the former, and Conan Doyle of the latter. And I think the relationship has usually been in the sense indicated by Chekhov's remark, and not the reverse. (Though Somerset Maugham's is a peculiar case. As a schoolboy he had already decided on a literary career. He deliberately chose to study medicine as a preparation for that career. After qualifying as a doctor and undergoing what we could call his internship he left medicine forever, as he had planned. I don't know how this should be fitted in to Chekhov's matrimonial metaphor.)

There is supposed to be a similar relationship between lawyers and mathematicians, though instances of it are certainly less numerous. At an rate two mathematicians of the first rank, Pervin and Cayley, earned their livings in the legal profession. And it is perhaps significant that the only professional mathematician in our own micro-microcosmos, Charles Wells, is one of those whom Derek Nelson dubs a "lawyer".

Well, what is the profession that forms a natural pair with diplomacy? Lawyers seem to be out of it, according to Nicolson and Cochran.

Boardman seems to regard scientists as the antitheses of lawyers, but my feeling would be that scientists would make very poor diplomats. The essence of the scientific method is to have a simple a problem as possible. If air resistance, say, is a troublesome secondary effect to the thing you are interested in, you do your first experiments in a vacuum. After you have thoroughly studied the phenomenon there, you then look into what modifications you will have to make to take account of air resistance. But a diplomat will always have troublesome secondary issues to confound him. Refugees, for example. If he behaved like a scientist he would shoot the refugees so that he could study the problem in its pure form first; next week he will consider how the refugees modify his original solution. In practice, it will be found much more difficult to revive the dead refugees than it is to add air resistance to a system originally studied in vacuo.

Who, other than professional diplomats, are the best natural diplomats? The ambassador who has ascended all the stages of his country's Foreign Service is diplomacy's husband; who is her lover?))

NEW BLOOD

Allan B. Calhamer, 201 West Street, NYC, 10011, inventor of the game, writes to say that

K. R. Lee, Jr., 105 Seventh St., S.E., Washington, DC, 20003 is interested in Diplomacy.

Buddy Bretick, 3702 Wendy Lane, Silver Springs, Md., 20906, writes to say that

Raymond Stokely, 2419 Seminary Road, Silver Springs, Md., 20910, is interested in the game.

Jack Greene, Jr., 670 Darrell Rd., Millsborough, Calif., 94010, writes to say that

Marcia Wolfe, 525 Barbara, Millsborough, Calif., 94010, is a new player of Diplomacy.

And, Bob Kinney, 1021 Paradise Lane, Tacoma, Wash., 98466, disdains the use of intermediaries and writes to say that he is, himself, interested in the game.

Some enterprising gamesmaster might be able to get a game going with that list alone.

- - - - -

That quotation from Nicolson having produced so much comment I think I'll lift another quote from his book.

"The foundation of good diplomacy is...credit, confidence, consideration, and compromise."

Harold Nicolson: Diplomacy.

My experience is that the first three c's are as essential to our game, Diplomacy, as they are to the diplomacy of the wider world. As to the fourth, I am not so sure. Since there are seven players, the ambition of each being to win, it is certain that some compromise of their ambition is a necessity if there is to be any negotiation at all. However, if there are two allied players, with some common design in prospect, it is almost certain that each of them will have to use a proportion of their forces on other fronts. What they will have remaining to contribute to their common effort will, therefore, be limited. Say they have four such forces that they can use to their common advantage, each contributing two. If there are two possible ways of making the attack, each of the players supporting one method, a compromise plan employing parts of both will in most circumstances fail. At this tactical level it is confidence, not compromise that is needed, confidence great enough so that one or the other will be willing to go along completely with the other's plan.

DIPLCDDING GWA is a journal of postal Diplomacy. Published by J. A. McCallum, Ralston, Alberta, Canada, it sells for ten cents.